November 25, 2013

Explosion of acid tank in Fertilizer Plant

 An empty acid tank exploded during maintenance. This occurred in a phosphate fertiliser manufacturing facility in the USA. The lid of the tank apparently flew 100 feet in the air. Two people were injured.There is a lesson from this and other similar incidents - tanks are dangerous, be it empty or full. Follow all proper hot work precautions. Even waste water tanks have exploded during hot work due to the release of gases.

Read about the incident in this link.


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November 19, 2013

Fatality due to gas powered generator

In 2007, a pipeline x ray technician who was developing films in a portable darkroom died due to CO poisoning caused by a gas powered generator. If you use diesel or gas powered generators inside closed spaces, be careful as CO will accumulate. Read the fatal alert in this link.

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November 15, 2013

Fire in Chevron Refinery

Fire in refinery


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Lightning causes tank to explode

A salt water tank containing trace amounts of hydrocarbon exploded in the USA after a lightning strike. The explosion of the tank caused other nearby tanks also to catch fire. This incident highlights the importance of maintaining the integrity of your lightning protection system. Many plant managers do not pay heed to this protection system, thinking it will never happen.
Read about the incident and see a video in this link

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November 8, 2013

Chevron Fire One Year Later - What Will It Take to Prevent Another? - New America Media

Excellent article!

Chevron Fire One Year Later - What Will It Take to Prevent Another? - New America Media

"There needs to be a fundamental shift of the burden of proof that a company is operating safely. Right now, the burden of proof lies with public agencies; they’re charged with playing Sherlock Holmes and trying to find hazardous conditions. What’s needed is to shift the burden of responsibility for safe operation to the plant. They have to demonstrate their competence in health, safety, and environmental performance as a condition of operation. Then a public agency can determine whether the plant is meeting those standards, and whether they’re sufficiently competent or not. That would change things. And, if the whole process is much more transparent and accessible to the public, that would make health, safety, and environmental performance much more compelling to the plant management".

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Structural integrity failure incident

A newly constructed dome for storing iron ore collapsed. Luckily no one was injured. See the pictures and article in this link. The cause of incident is under investigation.

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November 5, 2013

Trevor Kletz passes away

The father of process safety has passed away at the age of 91. Dr Trevor Kletz had authored many books on process safety and also introduced the concept of inherent safety much before the Bhopal disaster. My early working days were spent devouring his well written books and his subtle sense of humour. I  pray his soul rest in peace!

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November 4, 2013

Another view of behaviour based safety programs

I have always maintained the view that behaviour based safety programs will succeed only if top managements behaviour is also observed and corrected. Read an interesting article from a unions perspective in this link. This article should be read by all top management.

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November 2, 2013

HPCL Fire investigation

 According to a Times of India report, the Oil Industry safety directorate has faulted HPCL management for the August 23rd inferno in the cooling tower which claimed 28 lives.The article mentions the following:
"Revealing the lack of precautions taken by HPCL-Visakha Refinery, OISD said that internal pre-commissioning safety audit was done by a multi-disciplinary team of HPCL but the "recommendations/ pending jobs were not completed".
The lapses list
** Management failed to stop commissioning even though several processes remained unfinished
** Nearly 100 personnel were allowed to be present and work at the site during commissioning
** No senior official was available at the site and commissioning activity was left to one supervisor only
** Hazard identification not done and no risk analysis carried out
** Hot job carried out under the supervision of the maintenance department
** Contract workers not told to leave the site before the commissioning of the facilit
  Read the article in this link.

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November 1, 2013

HAPPY DIWALI

HAPPY DIWALI TO ALL MY READERS YOUR FAMILY! ENJOY!!



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COMMENTS ON CHEMICAL PLANT SAFETY & SECURITY RATING SYSTEM


I appreciate the initiative on the new safety and security rating system for chemical plants by the Indian Government and am sharing my comments sent to the Ministry on the new safety rating system:
1.    The initial screening criteria will eliminate many of the existing chemical units in the small and medium scale sector which also handle highly hazardous chemicals.  In such a case, what will be the action? I suggest that Initially, for SME sector, certification to OHSAS 18001 could be made mandatory and the proposed safety and security rating system be applied to MAH units. Later the modalities to extend it to SME sector could be worked out.
2.      In the initial screening criteria, one of the KPI’s is mentioned as “approved and documented PSM system available and implemented”. There is no reference to which PSM model to follow. I suggest that the basic OSHA CFR 1910.119 PSM rule of USA be followed. The threshold limit of chemicals for which PSM system applies could be the same list used in MSIHC rules.
3.    Any rating system is a snapshot of the organisations safety performance. However, in process safety management, top management commitment and technical competency of the people who run the system are important for achieving incident free performance. The proposal for the new safety rating system suggests that organisations with good safety performance will be incentivized. The opposite of this must also be implemented – if an organization that has been rated either 3,4 or 5 star in the new rating system experiences a reportable accident ( as defined in factory rules) after the award of the rating and within the periodicity of assessment, then the rating should automatically be downgraded to “Poor”.  This will ensure continued top management focus. The list of organizations who have been thus downgraded may be publicized on the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers website or on a new website specifically dedicated to the “Chemical Plant Safety and Security Rating system”
4.      In the 19 KPI’s of final assessment, KPI’s 12,13 and 14 (Contractor management, emergency preparedness and response and training and competency) are already covered in the PSM system mentioned in KPI 2. They can be assessed as part of the PSM system.
5.      As the concept of “Occupier” and “Factory Manager” is already legally required for companies, I suggest that both of them be mandatorily assessed in final assessment on how they track PSM performance as well as competency levels to maintain the PSM system.
6.      In the evaluation questionnaire for PSM, in point 2.3, it is asked if QRA/LOPA is done for all operations and recommendations implemented? Instead, the question could be Whether Hazard Identification and risk analysis based on guidelines of IS 15526:2006 has been carried out and recommendations implemented?
7.      Finally, the new rating system will be recognized as unbiased and transparent by the public only if the if the assessment evidences for those organisations that have been awarded “Good, Very Good and Excellent” are posted on the website of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers or on a new website specifically dedicated to the “Chemical Plant Safety and Security Rating system”
                                                   END
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